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form. They fail to be one in form just because the form of animal has been differentiated into the form of man and the form of horse. This argument reveals the crucial difference between genera and substantial forms. Precisely because a substantial form is ἄτομον—not further divisible into different forms—it is a τόδε τι, a *this*, something definite. The form is therefore *proper* to individuals such as Socrates and Callias, even though they are numerically distinct.

University of Pittsburgh

ARISTOTLE'S BASIC AND NON-BASIC VIRTUES

STEPHEN M. GARDINER

THE structure of Aristotelian virtue ethics has been substantially misunderstood. Conventional wisdom has it that Aristotle, as indeed all of the major philosophers of ancient Greece, believed that the virtues are reciprocally entailing (RV): a person can have one of the virtues of character if and only if she has them all.[1] Since Aristotle claims that εὐδαιμονία, or happiness, requires a virtuous character, RV implies that a person needs all the virtues in order to be happy. But I shall argue that Aristotle accepts neither RV nor its implication.[2] Instead, he distinguishes between a set of basic and a set of non-basic virtues, and claims that only the basic virtues are reciprocally entailing. Hence, he rejects RV. Furthermore, he believes that, given at least a moderate amount of external goods, the basic virtues alone are both necessary and sufficient for happiness. Hence, he rejects the claim that a person needs all the virtues in order to be happy.

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[1] This formulation is from T. H. Irwin, 'Disunity in the Aristotelian Virtues' ['Disunity'], *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* [*OSAP*], suppl. vol. (1988), 61–78. I assume that philosophers who endorse the unity of the virtues would take that view to imply RV. For ascription of a unity thesis to Aristotle and other Greek philosophers see e.g. John Cooper, 'The Unity of Virtues' ['Unity'], in Ellen Paul *et al.* (eds.), *Virtue and Vice* (Cambridge, 1998), 233–74, repr. in his *Reason and Emotion* (Princeton, 1999), 76–117; and Julia Annas, *The Morality of Happiness* [*Morality*] (Oxford, 1993), 73–8.

[2] The main text I shall be discussing is the *Nicomachean Ethics*. But I shall also mention relevant passages from the *Politics*, *Eudemian Ethics*, and *Magna Moralia*.

My discussion is motivated by an influential paper by T. H. Irwin. Irwin has shown that RV conflicts with Aristotle's explicit remarks about magnificence and magnanimity, and he believes that this conflict exposes a deep contradiction at the heart of Aristotle's theory. Furthermore, he argues that the contradiction is best resolved by withdrawing the claim that magnificence and magnanimity are separable. By contrast, I argue that there are compelling textual and theoretical reasons to reject RV.

The textual reasons are as follows. First, in the passage usually thought to commit Aristotle to RV, he may attribute reciprocity only to a subset of the genuine virtues, and so may exclude magnificence and magnanimity from its scope. Second, such an exclusion would fit well with other remarks Aristotle makes about happiness and the role of external goods. Third, overall, Aristotle's remarks are best explained by supposing that he distinguishes a set of basic from a set of non-basic virtues, attributes reciprocity only to the basic virtues, and maintains that the non-basic virtues are asymmetrically dependent on the basic virtues.

The textual evidence is supported by significant theoretical considerations. In particular, restricting reciprocity in this way provides a better way out of Irwin's problem than Irwin's own solution of retaining RV. First, there are problems with the rationale for retaining RV. Initially, retaining RV appears plausible because it is required by the orthodox inclusivist interpretation of Aristotle's ethics, and the inclusivist account seems both independently appealing and to provide a rationale for reciprocity. However, the orthodox interpretation does not really justify RV; and in any case RV makes Aristotelian virtue ethics much too demanding of the virtuous agent (as Irwin himself argues). Second, the new reading does considerably better in both respects. On my account, Aristotle believes that magnificence and magnanimity are non-basic because they govern relative goods, and holds that the basic virtues alone are sufficient for happiness, given at least a moderate amount of external goods. Hence, he has principled reasons to restrict the scope of his reciprocity claim, and this helps to limit the demandingness of virtue.

1. Non-reciprocal virtues

Aristotle says that wealth and honour each have two virtues associated with them, one to deal with small-scale matters, and another to deal with larger concerns. In the case of wealth, generosity concerns itself with small matters, and magnificence with large expenditures; in the case of honour, a nameless virtue (call this 'proper pride') addresses small-scale matters, and magnanimity large-scale matters. But Irwin has pointed out that Aristotle also remarks (1) that 'the magnificent person is generous, but generosity does not imply magnificence' (1122^a28–9); (2) that 'someone who is worthy of little and thinks so is temperate, but not magnanimous; for magnanimity is found in greatness' (1123^b5–6);[3] and (3) that the relation of proper pride to magnanimity 'seems similar to the relation of generosity to magnificence' (1125^b1–8).[4] Thus, Aristotle explicitly claims that a person can be generous, but not magnificent; temperate, but not magnanimous; and (presumably) appropriately proud, but not magnanimous. All three claims directly conflict with RV.[5]

Irwin argues that the general difficulty for Aristotle is that he seems committed to three, mutually inconsistent, claims: (1) that magnificence and magnanimity are genuine and distinct virtues; (2) that an agent can have other virtues without having magnificence and magnanimity; and (3) RV. The easiest resolution of this difficulty would be to claim that at least one of the above assertions is merely a momentary oversight on Aristotle's part, or at least a superficial component of his view that could easily be jettisoned.

[3] At *EE* 1232^a31 Aristotle says that magnanimity 'seems to [*φαίνεται*] accompany [*ἀκολουθεῖν*] all the virtues'. This might seem to conflict with the claim made here, and even to assert RV. (See e.g. Stephen A. White, *Sovereign Virtue* (Stanford University Press, 1992), 255.) But this would be too quick. First, the remark may claim simply (*a*) that if one has magnanimity, one must have the other virtues, but not (*b*) that the reverse holds. Second, the context suggests that the passage must be understood as reporting the common beliefs, not asserting Aristotelian doctrine. (This seems to be White's view, since he also claims that 'Aristotle denies that being virtuous is enough for having [magnanimity]' (258, also 268).) Hence, *φαίνεται* should be understood in the non-veridical sense.

[4] For this discussion see Irwin, 'Disunity', 61–2. (The issue is also noted and discussed by Aquinas, *ST* 1–2 q 65 a 1.) Additional evidence comes from *EE* 1233^a16–27 and *NE* 1123^b13.

[5] Aristotle makes other remarks that seem to conflict with RV. Irwin notes 1115^a 29–22 ('Disunity', 62 n. 2); and Neera Badhwar, crediting Fred Miller, notes 1129^b31–1130^a14 (see 'The Limited Unity of Virtue' ['Limited Unity'], *Nous* (1996), 303–29 at 329 n. 25). These passages are not considered here.

But Irwin argues that this is implausible because Aristotle has good philosophical reasons for accepting all three assertions, at least two of them (the first and third) are deeply embedded in his ethical theory, and rejecting any one of them would have serious consequences for the integrity of the overall position.

Irwin has identified a serious problem for Aristotle and for Aristotelian-style virtue ethics. If his diagnosis is correct, Aristotle himself is straightforwardly inconsistent; and in order to escape the inconsistency, Aristotelians will have to drop one of three theoretically important claims. Furthermore, Irwin makes a persuasive case that Aristotelians should retain the claim that is perhaps easiest of the three to reject: that magnificence and magnanimity are genuine and distinct virtues.[6] He argues that Aristotle (1) demands that the virtuous person be successful in action, and (2) assumes that the large-scale virtues address formidable tasks and so require knowledge, capacities, and habituation significantly beyond that required for the smaller-scale virtues if they are to lead to successful action. Hence, Aristotle's recognition of distinct large-scale virtues is 'not an anomaly in his thought about the virtues, but reflects a demand for knowledge and experience that is reflected elsewhere in his views about virtue and wisdom'.[7]

Irwin's defence of the large-scale virtues is intuitively plausible. For example, in the case of magnificence, it seems reasonable to say that the virtuous *nouveaux riches* encounter a genuinely different set of moral circumstances when they win the lottery, and that it requires much more than the normal virtue of generosity to handle this change well. If this is correct, the Aristotelian must give up either the separability of the large-scale virtues, or RV itself. Irwin opts for the first option, but argues that it implies that the life of virtue is unreasonably demanding. But I shall argue for rejecting RV, on the grounds that Aristotle himself did not accept it. This does imply that the project of Aristotelian virtue ethics needs to be rethought, but not because of some deep and

[6] There are two main options here. Consider the example of wealth. First, one might claim that there is really only one virtue concerned with wealth, but that this has two aspects: generosity and magnificence. This is obviously problematic, in that there is no doubt that Aristotle regards generosity as a genuine and distinct virtue. Second, one might claim that the one virtue is really generosity, and that magnificence is an aspect of generosity. But Aristotle explicitly says that magnificence has a distinct mean.

[7] Irwin, 'Disunity', 66.

lurking inconsistency. Instead, it is because Aristotle himself has been seriously misunderstood.

2. Re-reading reciprocity

The best evidence for RV is the following passage:[8]

> Moreover, ⟨our⟩ account would dissolve in the following way the dialectical argument that someone might use to show that the virtues are separate from each other: that the same person is not naturally most disposed towards all ⟨the virtues⟩, so that he will have already acquired one before he acquires another. This is possible with the natural virtues, but it is not possible with those ⟨virtues⟩ in respect of which someone is called good unconditionally [ἁπλῶς]. For all ⟨these virtues⟩ are present at the same time as practical wisdom, which is a single state. ($1144^{b}32$–$1145^{a}2$)

For, on the usual reading, when Aristotle contrasts the natural virtues with 'those ⟨virtues⟩ in respect of which someone is called good unconditionally', he is contrasting them simply with all the genuine virtues. Hence, his point is that all the genuine virtues are reciprocally entailing (i.e. RV).

However, in the light of Irwin's problem, I propose an alternative. When Aristotle speaks of 'those ⟨virtues⟩ in respect of which someone is called good unconditionally', he could be taken to be *qualifying* the claim that all genuine virtues are inseparable, and asserting that inseparability applies only to all those genuine virtues *which are required to be called unconditionally good*. This is important because perhaps not all of the genuine virtues are required for unconditional goodness; perhaps unconditional goodness requires only a subset of the genuine virtues.[9]

If correct, this new interpretation would be important both for its substance and for its implication. The substance would be that Aristotle implicitly distinguishes a set of genuine virtues that is required for being called unconditionally good from a set that is not required. (Let us call virtues of the first kind 'the basic virtues', and those of the second kind 'the non-basic virtues'.[10]) The implication

[8] This is the passage cited by Annas, Cooper, and Irwin.

[9] 'Unconditionally' here is ἁπλῶς, meaning 'simply' or 'simpliciter'. Unfortunately, this word is as ambiguous in Greek as in English, and might support both readings. For it can mean 'under normal circumstances', or 'under all circumstances'.

[10] Strictly speaking, the claim about unconditional goodness does not itself dis-

would be that Aristotle explicitly attributes inseparability only to the basic virtues, not to all the genuine virtues. This would make it reasonable to infer that the non-basic virtues are excluded from the scope of the reciprocity claim, so that Aristotle is not asserting RV, but only the Reciprocity of the Basic Virtues (RBV): a person can have one of the basic virtues if and only if she has all of the basic virtues.

The new reading thus provides a way out of the contradiction Irwin poses for Aristotle. If Aristotle holds that magnificence and magnanimity are non-basic virtues, then RBV does not apply to them. In that case, the apparent conflict between his claim about inseparability, the claim that the large-scale virtues are genuine virtues, and the claim that we can have other virtues without having the large-scale virtues dissolves. For, since RBV would apply only to the basic virtues, it would be perfectly possible to possess those virtues without possessing the large-scale virtues.[11]

3. Assessing the new reading

Unfortunately, the new reading seems, to say the least, somewhat unnatural. First, the usual reading appears to make much better sense in the immediate context of the passage. For there Aristotle seems to be talking about the contrast between natural and genuine virtues *per se*. Second, it would be deeply puzzling for Aristotle to

tinguish a set of virtues as basic and a set as non-basic. For it is compatible with a disjunctive theory of the kind offered by Richard Kraut, who claims that reciprocity requires only at least one virtue in a given area. (See Kraut, 'Comments on "Disunity in the Aristotelian Virtues" by T. H. Irwin' ['Comments'], *OSAP*, suppl. vol. (1988), 79–86.) On such a theory, there is no *set* of basic virtues, as any virtue might satisfy the requirement on some occasion. Nevertheless, the textual evidence shows that Aristotle excludes certain particular virtues from the requirement (magnificence and magnanimity); indeed, he seems to exclude these because they are virtues of a particular kind (large-scale virtues). This counts in favour of the basic–non-basic virtues distinction, and against views of Kraut's kind. See the discussion of Kraut below.

[11] It might be said against this that Aristotle also says that the person of practical wisdom deliberates 'not about some restricted area—e.g. about what promotes health or strength—but about what promotes living well in general' (1140ª25–8). But the restricted area mentioned by Aristotle here is much more restricted than that covered by the basic virtues. This may fairly be said to concern 'living well in general', especially given the later account of the relationship between the basic virtues, happiness, and the correct conception of the good.

introduce an important theoretical distinction between basic and non-basic virtues so surreptitiously. Third, it would be especially puzzling for Aristotle to do this when the reciprocity claim is familiar from earlier writers and not obviously curtailed there. These points create a presumption against the new reading, in the light of which one would need strong independent reasons to accept it. In this section I present four reasons of this sort.

The first involves considerations of charity. Aristotle says nothing explicit to indicate that he means his overall argument in *NE* 6. 13, and in particular the remark about reciprocity, to apply to magnificence and magnanimity. Hence, given that elsewhere he explicitly says that these virtues are not reciprocally entailing, it is charitable to assume that he does not intend 'all the virtues' here to mean 'all the genuine virtues'. Furthermore, Irwin's problem is such that any argument which tries to show that Aristotle is consistent requires reading some passages in a non-obvious way, and it is (arguably) easier to quibble about the central text supporting RV than the three that say explicitly that the large-scale virtues are separable, or the many that suggest that they are genuine virtues.

The second reason is that the worry about the immediate context of Aristotle's reciprocity claim can be disarmed. Not only is this context compatible with the new reading, it may even count in its favour. Consider the following. Initially, the usual reading seems overwhelmingly plausible because Aristotle has just been discussing the distinction between natural virtue and virtue in the strict sense (ἡ κυρία ἀρετή). This makes it natural to assume in the crucial passage (UR1) that Aristotle is referring to all virtues that are virtues in the strict sense, (UR2) that by 'virtue in the strict sense' he means simply all the genuine virtues, and (hence) (UR3) that he means to assert RV. But this line of thought is open to challenge.

First, contrary to initial appearances, Aristotle's remarks about ἡ κυρία ἀρετή may actually support the new reading. Aristotle is in the process of arguing against the claim that practical wisdom (φρόνησις) makes us no readier to do fine and just actions (1144ª11–13). He proceeds by trying to show that practical wisdom requires virtue (1144ª29–31), and that we cannot possess practical wisdom without being good (1144ª36–ᵇ1). Then, to explain the role of virtue, he refers to the problem of the natural virtues. He says:

everyone supposes that each ⟨type of⟩ character is present to some extent by nature: that is, because we have justice and suitability to temperance and bravery and the others immediately from birth. But we still search for something different, that which is good in the strict sense [κυρίως] and for these others to be present in a different way. For the natural states are present in both children and beasts, but without understanding they are evidently harmful. At any rate we seem to see this much, that just as a heavy body moving without sight happens to fall heavily because of the lack of sight, so it is here: if someone acquires understanding [νοῦς], he improves in his actions; and his state now, while being similar ⟨to natural virtue⟩, will be virtue in the strict sense [κυρίως]. (1144^{b}4–14)

Hence, according to Aristotle, the natural virtues are harmful because they involve a kind of blindness which renders one liable to take heavy falls (1144^{b}10–12). This problem is resolved by understanding (νοῦς) (1144^{b}12–13); and a person with understanding has virtue in the strict sense (κυρίως) (1144^{b}14).

Now, according to the usual reading, 'virtue in the strict sense' means simply all the genuine virtues. But this is not the only way of reading the passage. Instead, we might take a more minimalist approach and understand 'virtue in the strict sense' to refer to *whatever state solves the problem posed by the natural virtues.* Read this way, the passage leaves open the question of whether solving the problem requires *all the genuine virtues.*

This helps the new interpretation of the reciprocity passage. For the tempting thought is that 'virtue in the strict sense' refers only to the basic virtues.[12] This is tempting because, on the new reading, the basic virtues are sufficient for unconditional goodness, and it is plausible to suppose that this means that they solve the problem posed by the natural virtues.[13] Indeed, this is especially plausible if, as I shall argue below, the claim about unconditional goodness is taken by Aristotle to imply that the basic virtues are sufficient for happiness (at least for those with moderate external goods).

[12] On this reading Aristotle accepts (UR1) but denies (UR2). Alternatively, one might dispute (UR1) and claim that the phrases τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθόν and ἁπλῶς ἀγαθός are not equivalent because the virtues required to be unconditionally good (ἁπλῶς ἀγαθός) are a subset of the genuine (κυρίως) virtues. On this reading, Aristotle is not speaking loosely, but explicitly marks the vital distinction. His fault is that he does it without highlighting this fact to the reader.

[13] An alternative, though not incompatible, explanation of this would be that there are no natural virtues associated with magnificence and magnanimity. If so, the large-scale virtues do not remove the kind of problem addressed here, and so are not part of virtue in the strict sense, if this is tied to solving such problems.

Second, the overall structure of *NE* 6. 12–13 lends support to restricting the scope of the reciprocity claim to only some of the genuine virtues. Aristotle is addressing the general worry that practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom (σοφία) might be useless. Against this claim he argues (1) that because each is the virtue of one of the two rational parts of the soul, both practical and theoretical wisdom are choiceworthy in themselves even if neither produces anything at all (1144^{a}1–3); and (2) that they do produce something. On the one hand, (2*a*) theoretical wisdom produces happiness because it is a part of virtue as a whole, and a state that we possess and activate (1144^{a}2–6). On the other hand, (2*b*) together with moral virtue, practical wisdom enables us to fulfil our function because virtue makes the goal correct, and practical wisdom makes what promotes the goal correct (1144^{a}6–9). This is relevant because in the sections we have been concerned with Aristotle is arguing for (2*b*), that practical wisdom is useful. This suggests that his claims are not meant to apply to theoretical wisdom, and hence that the reciprocity thesis does not apply to it.[14] Thus, the context of the passage is already such that the reciprocity thesis applies only to a subset of the genuine virtues.

Third, this claim gains support from the argument offered immediately after the reciprocity passage. Aristotle says, 'It is clear that even if it [practical wisdom] were not practical, we would need it on account of its being the virtue of this part ⟨of the soul⟩ . . .' (1145^{a}2–4). This suggests that practical wisdom would not be needed for the reasons culminating in the reciprocity passage if it were not practical. In other words, if it were not for its role in ἡ κυρία ἀρετή, practical wisdom would be needed only in the way that theoretical wisdom is needed, as a part of virtue as a whole; and presumably this is because its impracticality would make it unnecessary for happiness in the same way as theoretical wisdom is unnecessary for happiness. But if this is correct, a similar case may be made

[14] This view is apparently shared by Aquinas, *ST* 1–2 q 8 a 4. Aquinas takes moral virtue to be possible without some of the intellectual virtues, such as theoretical wisdom, but to require understanding and practical wisdom. Though Aristotle does not explicitly say that theoretical wisdom is not required for unconditional goodness, Aquinas' reading makes good sense of *NE* 6. 12–13, as well as of Aristotle's later claim that the life of contemplation is the happiest, and the political life is happiest in a secondary sense (1177^{b}16–21; 1178^{a}4–10). Of course, even if Aquinas is correct that the reciprocity claim does not apply to all the intellectual virtues, it may still be that Aristotle believes that reciprocity applies to all the *moral* virtues, including magnificence and magnanimity. But Aquinas at least denies this also, *ST* 1–2 q 65 a 1.

for magnificence and magnanimity. For most people, these virtues cannot be put into practice, because they lack the external goods necessary to exercise them. Hence, for most people, magnificence and magnanimity are impractical, and unnecessary for happiness in the same way that theoretical wisdom is.[15] But this does not adversely affect the claims (1) that they are genuine virtues, (2) that they are a part of the whole of virtue, and (3) that they can make a positive contribution to happiness. For these claims are all true of theoretical wisdom.

The third reason supporting the new reading is that it best explains some puzzling remarks that Aristotle makes elsewhere. First, magnificence and magnanimity require large resources. But Aristotle explicitly says that we must not think that to be happy requires many large (*μεγάλων*) goods, and declares that someone can act virtuously even from moderate resources (*ἀπὸ μετρίων*) (1179^{a}1–6). Furthermore, he makes these claims even though he believes that virtuous actions require many external goods (1178^{b}2–3).[16] These remarks would be very strange if he endorsed RV, but they are easily explicable if he believes that only the basic virtues are required for happiness.

Second, Aristotle claims that many strokes of good fortune will

[15] It is perhaps worth noting that the very next section of the *Nicomachean Ethics* begins with the distinction of a superior kind of virtue, the heroic or divine virtue attributable to people like Hector (1145^{a}19–27). This is not properly called human virtue, and many commentators believe that it is characteristic of the magnanimous person. If this were correct, it would be reasonable to exclude magnanimity from the earlier reciprocity claim, as there Aristotle is clearly not speaking about heroic virtue. (See e.g. W. F. R. Hardie, 'Magnanimity in Aristotle's Ethics' ['Magnanimity'], *Phronesis*, 23 (1978), 63–79 at 72–3.)

[16] T. H. Irwin has mentioned to me (though not endorsed) the possibility that Aristotle intends to rule out only the level of resources of the tyrant or multimillionaire in this passage. (Aristotle does speak of not needing 'to rule earth and sea'; see also Irwin, 'Disunity', 73.) This seems doubtful. First, the word for 'magnificent', *μεγαλοπρεπής*, which literally means 'befitting a great man', is simply the adjectival form of Aristotle's word for greatness (*μεγαλοπρέπεια*); and Aristotle says magnificence is as the name suggests (1122^{a}22–4; *MM* 1192^{b}9–11). Second, the proposed reading hardly seems plausible for *μέτριος*, given Aristotle's descriptions of magnificent and magnanimous people. Third, earlier in *NE* 10. 8, in speaking of the happy contemplators' need for external resources, Aristotle mentions only a healthy body, food, and other things needed for a human life (1178^{b}34–5; also 1178^{b}7). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in speaking of the happy politician's (greater) need for external goods, Aristotle conspicuously fails to mention the large-scale virtues. In particular, though he admits that the virtuous person needs money (1178^{a}34), he explicitly mentions only generosity, the small-scale counterpart of magnificence, and not magnificence itself.

make the virtuous person's life more blessed (1100^{b}25–8); that additional external goods 'adorn' the happy person's life (*συνεπικοσμεῖν*, 1100^{b}26–7); and he speaks of one large-scale virtue, magnanimity, as an 'adornment' (*κόσμος*) of the virtues (1124^{a}1–2). Irwin himself draws attention to these passages,[17] and points out that they appear paradoxical in the light of Aristotle's explicit claim elsewhere that the virtuous person's life is complete (1097^{a}25–30) and lacking in nothing (1097^{b}14–16). For Aristotle seems to be saying that an increase in external goods can increase the happiness of a virtuous person, even though she would already have complete happiness without them, and furthermore that at least one of the large-scale virtues is associated with this increase.[18]

The passages are explicable if Aristotle accepts the distinction between basic and non-basic virtues.[19] For one thing, at the centre of this distinction is the claim that the basic virtues are required for unconditional goodness, and so for happiness: one is happy only if one has at least the basic virtues. For there to be any point to the distinction, the basic virtues must be necessary for happiness in a way that the non-basic virtues are not. The best way to explain this is to claim that it is implicit in the distinction that the basic virtues are not merely necessary, but also sufficient, for happiness in at least one restricted sense. The sense is this: in some appropriate contexts, whatever else is required for happiness, it is not the non-basic virtues; as far as virtue goes, the basic virtues are sufficient for happiness in these contexts.[20] For another thing,

[17] Irwin, 'Permanent Happiness: Aristotle and Solon', *OSAP* 3 (1985), 89–124 at 98–100; 'Disunity', 74.

[18] The existence of this paradox depends on an inclusivist interpretation of completeness and self-sufficiency in *NE* 1. 7, which many would resist. However, for present purposes I simply assume the inclusivist reading for the sake of argument. I do not wish to beg the question against inclusivism at this stage by rejecting it; and I see at least a dialectical advantage in my account's ability to resolve the paradox. Furthermore, the debate about these passages is much too extensive to take into account here. For a sophisticated account of the issues see Kraut, *Aristotle on the Human Good* (Princeton, 1989).

[19] As an additional alternative to the non-inclusivist reading of self-sufficiency, one might claim that Aristotle distinguishes between 'happy' (*εὐδαίμων*) and 'blessed' (*μακάριος*). This possibility is countenanced by H. H. Joachim, *The* Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 1951), 59, and David Ross, *The Works of Aristotle* (London, 1923). Persuasive arguments against the claim are offered by Irwin (trans.), *Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics* (Indianapolis, 1985), 388, and Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness* (Cambridge, 1986), 329–34.

[20] Later I shall argue that, given a moderate amount of external goods, the basic virtues are sufficient for happiness in all contexts; but that is not presupposed here.

the non-basic virtues must play some role, and given that they are genuine virtues, it is reasonable to claim that this role involves contributing to happiness. Furthermore, since Aristotle explicitly claims that happiness can be increased by the addition of external goods, and that the large-scale virtues require a large amount of external goods, it is reasonable to believe that it is these virtues, and their status as non-basic, that he has in mind in these passages. If this is so, his claims are (1) that considerable good fortune makes additional virtues accessible to the virtuous person through supplying her with the external goods necessary to develop them, and (2) that possession of these additional virtues makes the already happy person happier.[21]

The fourth and final reason in favour of the new reading is theoretical. Irwin identifies the main theoretical issue raised by the large-scale virtues as being whether Aristotle can avoid extending the demand for success so that the virtuous person must possess encyclopaedic knowledge. If Irwin is correct, it is striking that the distinction between basic and non-basic virtues is a clear first step in this direction. For if the virtuous person needs only the basic virtues to be virtuous and happy, then she needs only the knowledge, experience, and training associated with those virtues. She need not have the knowledge, experience, and training necessary for the non-basic virtues. So, there is a limit to what is demanded of her.

The four reasons constitute a powerful case in favour of the new reading. It remains to seek a more comprehensive and precise understanding of the crucial distinction between the basic and non-basic virtues, and to explore its textual and philosophical viability. With these aims in mind, I now take on two tasks. First, I consider three ways of developing the distinction between basic and non-basic virtues. The first two emerge from positions which seem to be in the same general spirit put forward by Richard Kraut and Roderick Long; the third is my own view. Second, I consider

[21] Irwin himself sees this point ('Disunity', 74). Nevertheless, overall he finds the suggestion implausible because he finds it difficult to reconcile with the importance Aristotle assigns to magnificence and magnanimity, and because he believes that, since the large-scale virtues are distinct virtues, they should develop and realize distinct human capacities, so that a life without them could hardly be complete, and the virtues realized in it can hardly constitute complete virtue. The first worry at least seems doubtful simply because Aristotle says that the large-scale virtues are separable in his discussion of them. I provide a reply to the second later in the paper.

this view in relation to Irwin's rival solution to the problem created by the large-scale virtues, and in particular, the apparent problem of demandingness.

4. Virtues and areas

Richard Kraut agrees that the way out of Irwin's problem is to reinterpret Aristotle's commitment to inseparability. Kraut claims that RV is usually read in a fine-grained way, and that it is this reading which gives rise to the problem with the large-scale virtues. On the fine-grained reading, RV is to be understood as a long series of biconditionals:[22]

> *Fine-grained RV*: One is temperate if and only if one is courageous; one is courageous if and only if one is generous; one is generous if and only if one is magnificent; etc.

On this reading, RV entails that the virtuous person must possess all the virtues. But Kraut suggests an alternative, coarse-grained reading:

> *Coarse-grained RV*: One has the virtue concerned with pleasure if and only if one has the virtue concerned with fear and confidence; one has the latter if and only if *one has a virtue* (*small-scale or large-scale*) *concerned with wealth*; and so on.

The coarse-grained reading makes three claims: (1) that one can divide the virtues into 'areas' (such as pleasure, fear and confidence, and wealth); (2) that some 'areas' have more than one virtue governing them; and (3) that one can have a virtue in one particular area if and only if one has at least one virtue in each of the other areas. (Call this 'the Areas View' (AV).[23])

[22] The remarks in this section are drawn from Kraut, 'Comments', 82. One unfortunate (and presumably unintended) consequence of Kraut's formulation of his two interpretations is that it might suggest that inseparability is importantly linear: that is, that temperance depends primarily on courage and only secondarily on generosity, so that temperance requires courage directly, but requires generosity only because this is directly required for courage. This is misleading because Aristotle does not suggest that any particular basic virtue is *more directly* dependent on some other particular basic virtue than on the remaining basic virtues.

[23] This is one way to revise the understanding of 'all the virtues' in Aristotle's

Kraut claims that the Areas View solves the problem posed by the large-scale virtues. First, it accounts for the separability of the large-scale virtues. It implies that a virtuous person does not need a large-scale virtue if she already has a small-scale virtue which covers the same area, for the small-scale virtue alone will satisfy the Coarse-grained RV. Second, it preserves Aristotle's view about the role of practical wisdom. The crucial point about practical wisdom that supports RV is that it is a single, indivisible state that cannot be 'subdivided into independent pieces of wisdom—for example, insight about the value of honour, insight about pleasure, etc.' And the justification for this is the idea that to assess one kind of good properly, one must know how to assess the other kinds of good: to be virtuous in the sphere of wealth, one must be virtuous in the spheres of honour, pleasure, etc. But the Areas View respects this. Kraut says:

> this sort of argument for RV does not provide any reason for thinking that if someone is generous then he must also have the virtue of magnificence. For those two virtues govern the same good; the generous person and the magnificent person have the same conception of the good, and differ only because one can successfully apply that conception to a broader range of circumstances than can the other.

Indeed, he goes so far as to conclude that 'if Aristotle were to accept a narrow-grained reading of what RV entails, he would be misunderstanding his own reasons for adopting that principle. And that is too large a confusion to attribute to him.' Hence, he apparently believes that attributing narrow-grained RV to Aristotle is independently implausible, and perhaps that the Areas View is the *only* plausible account of the role of the virtues in practical wisdom.

Unfortunately, the Areas View runs into three main difficulties. The first is raised by Irwin, who rejects Kraut's explanation of RV because he rejects the claim that those with and those without magnanimity could have the same conception of the good.[23] This objection seems to count against any view that defends the separability of magnanimity, and perhaps of any virtue whatsoever.

reciprocity claim to accommodate the textual evidence about magnificence and magnanimity. Indeed, AV might gain plausibility in the light of some of the points about the reciprocity passage made above. But Kraut himself does not make these suggestions.

[24] Irwin, 'Disunity in the Aristotelian Virtues: A Reply to Richard Kraut', *OSAP*, suppl. vol. (1988), 87–90 at 88.

Fortunately, it is too quick. Even if someone with the large-scale virtues has a transformed conception of the good, this need not imply that her initial conception, based on the small-scale virtues, is thereby in error. A person with more external goods has more possibilities open to her, and this may cause her conception of the good to alter. But this does not imply that her former conception, based on a moderate amount of external goods, must be mistaken. Perhaps, as Kraut's own remarks suggest, she simply sees her former activities in a wider context.

The second difficulty concerns the status of the large-scale virtues as genuine virtues. First, Irwin complains that the Areas View implicitly denies this. Kraut's view requires that the large-scale virtues do not have a distinct 'area' of their own to govern because they do not govern distinct goods. Irwin, however, believes that this is reasonable only if one assumes that they are not distinct virtues, but just higher degrees of the same virtue. Second, Kraut responds to this objection by arguing that, even given their separability, whether the large-scale virtues are different virtues depends on how Aristotle individuates virtues, which we do not know, and which is not independently obvious. In the absence of independent evidence to resolve the issue, Kraut says, we should choose that interpretation which best preserves overall consistency, and this is the coarse-grained reading. However, third, Kraut's reply is unconvincing. Aristotle does tell us something about the individuation of virtues when he says that each virtue 'is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency' (1107^{a}2–3), and that the large-scale virtues each have their own means, excesses, and deficiencies (1121^{a}10–11; 1122^{a}29–32; 1125^{b}6–8; 1125^{a}17–18). This implies that important information is lost if, for example, it is said that both magnificence and generosity have the mean in regard to money. If there are two virtues, then there are two means, not one; and dealing correctly with wealth has a more complicated structure than might initially have been expected. A fully satisfactory account will preserve this extra information and explain its origins and importance.

The third difficulty with the Areas View is the most serious. Kraut's claim that one virtue in an area is sufficient does not account for the fact that Aristotle explicitly makes the relationship between the large-scale virtues and their small-scale counterparts *asymmetrical*. For Kraut's formula implicitly allows that one might

have magnificence without generosity, or magnanimity without proper pride.[25] But Aristotle explicitly denies this (1122ª29).[26] Hence, the Areas View is at best incomplete.[27]

[25] An asymmetry is suggested by Kraut's claim that the magnificent person applies the same conception of the good to a *broader* range of circumstances than the generous person, since this suggests that magnificence *includes* generosity. Strictly speaking, this is compatible with the Coarse-grained RV, since though the latter requires that one needs only one of the virtues concerning wealth, it would in fact be impossible to have magnificence alone. Nevertheless, it makes Kraut's formulation misleading, and it is unclear how it would fit with the idea that magnificence is a distinct virtue which governs large expenditures and has a distinct mean. In particular, the notion of inclusion that would need to be implicit must be made clear and defended.

[26] This problem also besets a close relative of AV recently put forward by Edward Halper, 'The Unity of the Virtues in Aristotle', *OSAP*, 17 (1999), 115–43. Halper distinguishes between 'psychic' virtues and 'proper' virtues. The 'proper' virtues actively pursue what is noble, while the 'psychic' virtues only avoid what is not noble (126). Halper argues that RV does not hold between all the 'proper' virtues, but 'any single act of "proper" virtue must be accompanied by acts of all "psychic" virtues' (133). This, he thinks, accords with Aristotle's rationale for RV, which is that a moral vice distorts a person's judgement (116). A 'psychic' virtue allows an agent to avoid vice, but does not impose extra demands of knowledge on the virtuous person, as it tells an agent what to do given that she lacks the knowledge characteristic of the corresponding 'proper' virtue.

Halper claims that his view solves Irwin's problem, since a person with generosity can have 'psychic' magnificence without having 'proper' magnificence, and a person with proper pride can have 'psychic' magnanimity without possessing 'proper' magnanimity (141). But note that on Halper's interpretation this will be true for all the virtues, as each 'proper' virtue has a 'psychic' corollary. Hence, Halper's view does not account for the fact that Aristotle makes these remarks only about the large-scale virtues, and that he posits an asymmetric relationship between them and their smaller-scale counterparts.

[27] A second alternative areas view, 'the Limited Unity of the Virtues' (LUV), is suggested by Badhwar ('Limited Unity'), though not as an interpretation of Aristotle. According to LUV, people's lives can be separated into domains, and particular virtues may be present in some domains but not others. The virtues present in each domain are mutually entailing *within that domain*, but there need be no relationships between virtues in different domains.

This account is generally sympathetic to the interpretation of Aristotle to be presented here. But the new interpretation differs from LUV (and Kraut's AV) in that LUV does not (*a*) restrict virtues to particular domains, nor (*b*) individuate domains by reference to goods. Furthermore, LUV individuates domains by reference to general psychological and normative criteria, and allows that these may differ between people ('Limited Unity', 317). Thus, it cannot explain the separability of the Aristotelian non-basic virtues considered as such, nor the complicated relationships of dependency in which they stand. The new interpretation not only does this, but supplies a justification for the status of the non-basic virtues.

5. Levels of virtues

A second alternative to RV is mentioned by Irwin and attributed to Roderick Long. The suggestion is:

> *Levels View* (LV): RV is true at each material level for all the virtues appropriate to that level, but does not hold between the virtues at different material levels.

The idea is that, though a person needs all the virtues that are accessible to her given a certain level of material resources, different virtues are accessible at different levels. Hence, some people need the large-scale virtues because they are rich in external goods, but those who are only moderately well-off need only the small-scale virtues.

The Levels View has advantages over the Areas View. For one thing, it is more consistent with the idea that the large-scale virtues are genuine virtues with distinct means. For another, it explains the asymmetry between the large-scale virtues and their small-scale counterparts. Presumably, higher levels subsume lower levels. Since the large-scale virtues deal with large amounts of their respective good, the person having them will also have to deal with small amounts.

Nevertheless, the Levels View is also incomplete, because it leaves much unexplained. For example, it does not say why Aristotle believes (1) that there are large-scale virtues only in the case of wealth and honour;[28] (2) that there are distinct and genuine virtues at different levels of external goods; (3) that genuine happiness is possible at each level; or (4) that the lower-level virtues are necessary and sufficient for happiness at that level, and the virtues present at higher levels are happiness-enhancing.[29] At the very least, then, the Levels View requires supplement. A fully successful account of the basic and non-basic virtues must explain

[28] Aristotle explicitly says that other virtues require external goods: justice requires money, courage requires power, and temperance requires freedom (1178ª30–5). So, why does he not posit higher-level virtues to correspond to justice, courage, and temperance?

[29] Why not distinguish a multitude of levels of external goods, each with different virtues and different levels of happiness? Why can one not be happy with a very low level of external goods so long as one uses them correctly? Why not distinguish the small-scale virtues not only from the large-scale virtues, but also from the medium-scale virtues, and the virtues needed by the destitute?

more of Aristotle's claims. In what follows we shall try to develop such an account.

6. The Non-basic virtues

One way to proceed is to return to the large-scale virtues, and explain why they are non-basic.[30] A virtue is non-basic if it is not required for being called unconditionally good. Furthermore, Aristotle clearly believes that the people who need the large-scale virtues have many more external goods than most people, and that these virtues are necessary to deal with these extra goods. Hence, what needs to be explained is why Aristotle believes that these extra goods and their associated virtues are not required for unconditional goodness. There seem to be two main possibilities.

The first is to augment the Levels View by claiming that it is a contingent fact that only some people have the large amounts of external goods necessary for the large-scale virtues. Perhaps Aristotle believes that though it is in principle possible for everyone to have such amounts, this simply does not happen in practice. And perhaps he believes that it is therefore unreasonable to demand magnificence and magnanimity for unconditional goodness.

Now, this first explanation may be sufficient to account for the status of the large-scale virtues as non-basic. However, it has two major deficiencies. First, the line of reasoning looks to be generalizable to all manner of unfortunate circumstances: it suggests that it is unreasonable to make a person's happiness depend on anything to which she does not have access. But this conflicts with Aristotle's view that happiness depends on at least a moderate level of external goods, and so is at least to some extent dependent on circumstances beyond the good person's control (1099^{a}31–4; 1178^{b}7; 1101^{a}6–13).[31] Second, if it were simply a contingent fact that only some people have the large amounts of external goods necessary for the large-scale virtues, it might still seem plausible to say that everyone needs these goods in order to be unconditionally good. After all, Aristotle's own insistence on at least a moderate amount of external goods seems plausible only because it seems possible to live a happy or flourishing life only given at least a minimal level of material prosperity. And one might maintain that this level is high enough to include the large amounts of external resources necessary for the large-scale virtues, especially given that such virtues govern genuine goods.

Given these deficiencies, I am tempted by a deeper explanation of the status of magnificence and magnanimity as non-basic virtues, and one which transcends rather than augments the Levels View. My suggestion is that the crucial feature of these virtues is that each governs an essentially relative good: magnificence requires being *relatively* rich,[32] and magnanimity requires having *relatively* higher capacities.[33] In other words, both virtues concern appropriate conduct when one is systematically better off than most people;[34] hence, their essential feature is not that acting

[30] It is worth noting that the large-scale virtues may not be the only non-basic virtues. (For example, Annette Baier and Jennifer Whiting have each pointed out to me that perhaps some of the small virtues, such as wit, may also be non-basic.) Furthermore, all non-basic virtues may not be non-basic for exactly the same reasons. But I do not consider these questions here. The account offered below is intended to explain only why the large-scale virtues are non-basic.

[31] There is also direct textual evidence that it is not merely statistical rarity that picks out the non-basic virtues. Even some basic virtues involve situations which do not occur very often. For example, Aristotle claims that becoming courageous is difficult because the relevant situations arise only infrequently (1119^{a}26–7).

[32] This is a natural inference from the focus on large amounts of money. However, Aristotle also says that magnificence is directed towards the public good (1122^{b}21–2), and Irwin argues that it is this feature of it that indicates that special knowledge and training are needed ('Disunity', 63–4). So, it may be possible to argue that it is the object of the virtue that is essential to its being distinct. I prefer the view that the relative advantage is the distinctive element, and the public good the appropriate object given this. This deserves further discussion, but this is not the place.

[33] Hardie argues that the magnanimous person is the heroic person, who Aristotle says is 'superhuman' and rarely found (1145^{a}17–34). The heroic person rises to 'heights of courage and endurance in circumstances of exceptional strain and difficulty' because his practice of virtue is not hindered 'by desires which are not bad but are an element in normal and virtuous human nature' (Hardie, 'Magnanimity', 72). This suggests, though Hardie himself does not explicitly say so, that the heroic person either lacks the troublesome desires or is able to overcome them. Either way, he is relatively advantaged over others. Hence, this would support my interpretation.

[34] By 'relatively better off' here, I do not mean to imply that the person who is $1 richer than another requires magnificence. That would be absurd. Presumably, one can have more money than others and still require merely generosity because this implies simply that one must involve oneself in more token generous acts. (This is suggested by 1120^{b}14–17.) The extra resources governed by the large-scale virtues

on them requires large amounts of external goods as such, but that it requires a person to have more such goods than other people.

There is sufficient textual evidence to make this second explanation a reasonable one.[35] Nevertheless, the main reason for taking the second explanation seriously is its theoretical advantages over the first.[36] First, if the goods that magnificence and magnanimity govern are essentially relative, as the second explanation claims, it is absurd to say that everyone needs these goods in order to be unconditionally good. For, since the kinds of situations that require magnificence and magnanimity are essentially cut off from most people, these virtues are *essentially* such that most people cannot exercise them. Second, this line of reasoning is not generalizable to just any unfortunate circumstance. The large-scale virtues are excluded because they are essentially inaccessible to most people. This is a justifiable exclusion because Aristotle is concerned about

clearly make possible actions of a different type. My suggestion is that they involve being *systematically* relatively better off than other people, in such a way that different types of behaviour are sustainable in a way that they are not for most. (This is suggested by Aristotle's references to Themistocles (*EE* 1233^{b}8–14) and to the poor person (1122^{b}27–30).)

[35] First, in general, Aristotle says that the names of both virtues are appropriate (1122^{a}23–6; *MM* 1192^{b}9–11; 1123^{a}34; *EE* 1232^{a}28–9), and both contain μεγαλο-, meaning 'great', which (as in English) can be taken as a relative term. Second, Aristotle says that the large-scale expenditure required for magnificence is large relative to oneself (1122^{a}25), that the right amount is fixed by reference to the identity of the agent and what resources he has (1122^{b}24–5), and that magnificence is what is appropriate in ornament (*EE* 1233^{a}33; *NE* 1123^{a}7) Third, in describing his meaning here, Aristotle uses the example of the Greeks' criticism of Themistocles (*EE* 1233^{b}8–15), and it is plausible to understand that criticism as arising because Themistocles pretended to have a status of relative advantage that he did not in fact have. (See Plut. *Themistocles*, 5.) Fourth, Aristotle says that the magnanimous person is superior (1124^{b}10–11) to ordinary people, but is moderate with them (1124^{b}20–3); he displays his greatness only to people with good fortune or a reputation for worth (1124^{b}17–20); and is to be contrasted with a person who deserves small things and claims them (*EE* 1232^{b}32–1233^{a}16).

[36] Some textual considerations also count against the first explanation. First, the magnificent person is concerned with large expenditures directed towards the public good, some of which could not in principle be shared with everyone else, or could not and still involve large expenditure. (For example, Aristotle says that the magnificent person should entertain foreign dignitaries (1123^{a}3), arrange public festivals, and build warships (1122^{b}23–4).) Second, a society consisting only of magnanimous people may be inconceivable, or at least unsustainable. (For example, Aristotle says that the magnanimous person is inactive and lethargic except for great honour or achievement (1124^{b}24–6), and does not face dangers in a small cause, or frequently (1124^{b}6–9).)

happiness *qua* human, and it is reasonable to demand that human happiness cannot depend on a state that most humans cannot *in principle* attain.[37]

This account of the non-basic virtues also helps to explain Aristotle's complex views about the interdependence of the virtues.[38] For one thing, it explains why he restricts reciprocity to the basic virtues. Most people will not need the large-scale virtues, simply because the goods they govern are never accessible to them. For another, it suggests that the large-scale virtues are asymmetrically dependent on the basic virtues. Though some people do not need the large-scale virtues because they are not relatively advantaged, everyone needs the basic virtues. Finally, it does not assume that the large-scale virtues themselves are reciprocally entailing. Magnificence and magnanimity govern different relative goods, and there is no reason (leaving aside expensive cosmetic surgery or genetic engineering) to believe that one relative good will bring along the other.[39]

[37] One might argue that systematic superiority over others is a necessary component of human happiness. But Aristotle believes that the happiness of the individual and that of the city are the same (1094^{b}7–9), hence he does not believe that the happiness of individuals is in radical conflict in this way.

[38] It is less easy to explain why Aristotle posits large-scale virtues only for wealth and honour, and not also for other external goods, such as power or freedom. In the case of power at least, it would seem that some people might systematically have much more power than others, and that the appropriate use of this power would constitute a relative advantage that requires a special virtue. Indeed, one might think that this is the special virtue needed by political rulers. I am not completely sure how to resolve this difficulty, which faces any account trying to make sense of the large-scale virtues. (One issue that may need to be resolved is why Aristotle believes the relevant virtues are essentially concerned with wealth and honour considered as external goods, whereas the virtues which require the other external goods (for example, courage requires power) are essentially concerned with something else (e.g. fear and confidence) and only incidentally with the external goods.) But a tempting thought is that a desirable state can count as a virtue only if it is one a citizen of a good society would need. Hence, perhaps large-scale virtues for power and freedom can be ruled out because systematic inequalities in these external goods are impermissible in a good society, whereas such inequalities in wealth and honour are permissible. (This approach may be suggested by *Pol.* 7. 3.) Aristotle also implies that there are limits to permissible material inequality in *Pol.* 4. 9.

[39] It is not so clear that the first explanation allows for this. LV in particular may suggest that there is a single material level which includes *all* extra external goods, and hence that the large-scale virtues become relevant en masse once one reaches a higher level.

7. The Non-basic virtues and happiness

It remains to explain the role of the basic and non-basic virtues in happiness. Consider first the basic virtues. Clearly, the idea behind their distinction as those virtues necessary for unconditional goodness is that they are both necessary and sufficient for the happiness of all those with moderate external goods (1179^{a}5–6; 1100^{b}25–8; 1124^{a}1–2). But the role of the non-basic virtues is more difficult to discern.

Clearly, the non-basic virtues make the virtuous person with extra external goods happier than she might otherwise be (1100^{b}25–8). But it is not clear whether they are necessary for her happiness. For they might play one of two roles. First, the non-basic virtues might be *required* for the happiness of those with abnormally large resources. This would imply that the basic virtues are *necessary but not sufficient* for the happiness of every person with at least moderate resources. Second, they might merely *add* to the happiness of those with abnormally large resources. This would imply that the basic virtues are both *necessary and sufficient* for the happiness of every person with at least moderate resources.

Now, each of these options has an unappealing aspect. The first suggests that a virtuous person could lose her happiness through the addition of external goods. This may seem plausible in the abstract. After all, one occasionally hears stories of happy people being destroyed by winning the lottery (though only occasionally). Nevertheless, several of Aristotle's claims count against it. He says that the virtuous person's happiness is relatively secure against fortune (1100^{b}18–22); and though he spends some time worrying about whether it is secure against bad fortune (1101^{a}6–14),[40] he does not even consider the possibility that it is not secure against good fortune. Instead, he simply assumes that the good person will bear fortune most finely (1100^{b}20), that her use of good fortune becomes fine and excellent (1100^{b}27–8), and that a truly good person always performs the finest actions from her resources (1101^{a}2–3).

[40] Aristotle explicitly says that the blessed person cannot become miserable (μακάριος) (1100^{b}34). But this is not decisive. It rules out the virtuous person's becoming positively unhappy. But it does not prevent her from losing her blessedness (1101^{a}7), and so, we might say, from becoming not-happy.

The second option is unappealing because it suggests that the kinds of skills that one needs in order to deal with these relative goods are somewhat unimportant, and, hence, that magnificence and magnanimity are not important virtues, or perhaps not virtues at all. This seems implausible given Irwin's defence of the genuineness of the large-scale virtues. To the extent that it seems plausible that the rich and the naturally well-endowed require special skills in order to acquire and maintain virtue, it seems that they need the large-scale virtues for happiness.

It is difficult to decide between these views. Arguably, the best option for an Aristotelian would be to accept the first, but try to minimize the impact of the admission that the sudden acquisition of a large amount of external goods threatens the virtuous person's happiness. Presumably, one does this by claiming that the person with the basic virtues comes to have the non-basic virtues more or less automatically once the additional external goods are provided. There seem to be two general approaches.

The first is to suggest that the large-scale virtues are *merely latent* in the person with the basic virtues, and so readily appear when extra external goods are available. For example, Aquinas says that it is possible to have the large-scale virtues without actually having the habits of these virtues, that one can have these in 'proximate potentiality' when one has the other virtues, and that one can acquire the relevant habits 'with but little practice' if one acquires the extra resources.[41] However, this view suffers from some deficiencies. First, it tends to suggest that RV is true after all: that is, that the large-scale virtues really are present (though admittedly not quite fully present) in the person with the basic virtues, and that all she lacks is the relevant extra external goods. Second, this claim seems to conflict with the idea that a new virtue must be acquired through habituation, that it takes time for this habituation to occur, and that, during this time, mistakes may be made. Third, it seems to invite the (plausible) objection that the mistakes the person starting out with the basic virtues makes in acquiring the new virtues threaten her happiness.

The second approach is to argue that the person with the basic virtues is merely *strongly predisposed to acquire* the non-basic virtues. The natural explanation for this would be that she already has some sensitivity to the goods they govern through having the

[41] Aquinas, *ST* 1–2 q 65 a 1.

basic virtues. Hence, when she acquires the extra resources, she recognizes that new goods are at stake, knows that a new virtue is needed, is motivated to acquire it, and has some idea about how to do so.[42]

The second account deals with the problem of RV, and takes seriously the status of magnificence and magnanimity as genuine virtues. But it does not address the problem of mistakes that might be made in acquiring the new virtues. However, here it is worth noting that Aristotle himself faces the problem. For, as noted above, he says that the good person always does the finest actions from her resources (1101^{a}2–3). If this is taken to mean 'the finest actions possible from such resources', then it seems to presuppose that the person with the basic virtues will always act as the magnificent or magnanimous person would, once given the necessary resources. But this is clearly implausible if such a person must learn the actions needed for these virtues, and performs at least some suboptimal actions while doing so.

Aristotle may be able to resist the implausibility. At 1101^{a}2–3 perhaps he means only 'the finest actions possible *for such a person* from such resources'. This claim is compatible with learning, since the finest actions possible for a learner are not the same as for someone who has mastered the skill.[43] Hence, it allows for suboptimal action.

This response solves the immediate textual problem, but leaves open the theoretical worry about happiness. Why does Aristotle not seem worried about good fortune, and the period of learning necessary to acquire the new virtues? In particular, why would he not think that the relevantly suboptimal actions constitute mistakes that threaten happiness? There seem to be two answers. First, perhaps the person with the basic virtues can adopt a method for acquiring the new virtue that, although suboptimal, protects her from substantive errors. In particular, Aristotle suggests that we acquire virtues by performing actions of the right type (1103^{b}1;

[42] A similar kind of suggestion is made by Badhwar, 'Limited Unity', 320. She argues that LUV denies that virtue in one domain can coexist with vice in all or most domains, because a wise person must not be fundamentally ignorant of other domains, but will necessarily have an understanding of the good in most domains. This requirement is weaker than the above suggestion in that it allows for vice in some domains, but stronger in that understanding of the good may require more than sensitivity to and recognition of the new good.

[43] Aristotle also introduces the remark with the phrase 'we suppose' (οἰόμεθα), which may indicate some hesitancy about the claim.

1105^{b}4–18), under appropriate guidance (1095^{b}4–13; 10. 9). So, perhaps the person with the basic virtues will seek out and follow the advice of an already magnificent or magnanimous person, in order to acquire the new virtue.[44] And perhaps under such guidance she will avoid mistakes that might threaten happiness. Second, surprisingly, Aristotle does not seem to take the kinds of mistakes we are concerned about very seriously. Instead, he explicitly says that *even systematic mistakes* with respect to the large-scale virtues are less serious than mistakes with respect to the other virtues (they are 'not too disgraceful' 1123^{a}31–3), and do not count as evil, but only as error (1125^{a}18–19). And this is so even though the states associated with such errors constitute *genuine vices* (1123^{a}31–2).

Now, this second response is hard to account for. Surely, we are inclined to say, being in a superior position not only makes one more, rather than less, likely to go off the rails ('power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely'), but also allows for more rather than less serious vicious behaviour (Plato's tyrant). So, Aristotle's view is the very opposite of what seems plausible.

Aristotle's apparent response is hardly persuasive. When claiming that the vices corresponding to magnificence are not too disgraceful, he also says that they do no harm to one's neighbours (1123^{a}32–3). But this explanation is flawed, for three reasons. (1) It could simply mean that these vices are purely self-regarding, and have no other-regarding effects. But this is clearly implausible: both magnificence and magnanimity aim at the common good. (2) Even if it were primarily self-regarding, this would not justify Aristotle's claim. For, arguably, intemperance and some of the other basic vices are primarily self-regarding; but this does not imply that they are not serious vices. (3) Given the interdependence of the virtues (i.e. the reciprocity for the basic virtues, and the idea that one cannot have a non-basic virtue without the basic virtues), one would expect a non-basic vice to disrupt the basic virtues. In particular, one would ultimately expect it to give rise to basic vices, which are serious and do cause harm to others.

The last of these problems applies to Aristotle whatever his justification for not taking the non-basic vices too seriously. To

[44] I thank Christine Korsgaard for this suggestion.

avoid it, he seems to need to assume that the non-basic vices are importantly *isolated* from their basic counterparts, so that their viciousness does not spread. This is important, because it suggests that Aristotle may adopt the second of our two earlier options: that the basic virtues are both *necessary and sufficient* for the happiness of every person with at least moderate resources, so that the non-basic virtues merely *add* to the happiness of those with abnormally large resources. For the best explanation for an isolation of errors about magnificence and magnanimity is that the set of basic virtues has a strong internal integrity that makes it resistant to errors elsewhere. But if the basic virtues have this integrity, it seems plausible to think that the happiness they produce under normal circumstances is resilient to an increase in good fortune. And this suggests that they are not merely necessary but also sufficient for the happiness of those who possess them.

Aristotle's account of the non-basic virtues is worthy of further investigation. However, for current purposes, it suffices to conclude that he seems to believe (1) that the basic virtues are those virtues which are necessary and sufficient for anyone aiming to be happy, and (2) that magnanimity and magnificence are non-basic because they increase the happiness of those with relative advantages, but are not necessary to their happiness.

8. Defending RV

The argument so far shows that the new reading is not only possible, but has considerable textual advantages over the usual reading. It remains to consider the theoretical issues. In particular, it might be said that only the usual reading does justice to Aristotle's views about the close connection between practical wisdom and the virtues, because only it justifies RV. Against this, I shall now argue that the usual rationale does not actually justify RV, but only (at best) RBV. Hence, this consideration also counts in favour of the new reading.

As we have seen, Aristotle believes that practical wisdom and virtue in the strict sense solve the problem posed by the natural virtues. Aristotle says that the person possessing only a natural virtue is like a blind person, constantly in danger of taking a heavy fall ($1144^{b}10$–12). According to Irwin, this suggests

that the natural virtues suffer from two deficiencies: they ensure neither correct behaviour ($1137^{a}9$–17, $1144^{b}9$) nor correct motivation ($1137^{a}17$–26, $1180^{b}20$).[45] Aristotle solves both problems by appealing to practical wisdom, and in particular the contributions of the virtues to practical wisdom. According to Irwin, the close relationship between practical wisdom and the virtues is to be explained by Aristotle's demand for success. Aristotle presupposes 'that we cannot assess an action as the right one for a brave person to do *without appraising it from the point of view of the other virtues*', and that practical wisdom ensures correct behaviour and motivation by guiding the co-operation of the virtues. Most importantly, since practical wisdom is sensitive to the demands of all the virtues, it can adjust individual virtues to the rest of the agent's aims in the light of its all-things-considered, global point of view. Hence, Aristotle accepts RV because he believes that the virtues have different aims that need to be co-operatively reconciled, that this can be done only by taking a global point of view, and that this requires practical wisdom, which is partly constituted by all the virtues. Since each virtue requires practical wisdom for correct action, and since practical wisdom is constituted by all the virtues, each virtue requires all the others, giving RV.[46]

There is something very plausible about Irwin's account. Nevertheless, it is worth working out what may stand behind it. In particular, it is worth asking why the virtues have different aims that need to be reconciled, why this should require anything so grand as a global point of view, and why a global point of view should require all the virtues. Irwin's answer is that Aristotle believes that the good has a unified and organic structure, such that 'we cannot understand the full value of each element in it without understanding its relation to the other elements'.[47] It is this view that ultimately grounds RV and Aristotle's resistance to accounts of the virtues which do not endorse RV.

Now, Irwin does not pursue the details of, or grounds for, Aris-

[45] The remarks in this paragraph are taken from Irwin, 'Disunity', 68–72.

[46] Similar arguments are offered by John Ackrill, *Aristotle the Philosopher* [*Aristotle*] (Oxford, 1981), 137; Annas, *Morality*, 76; Cooper, 'Unity', 266; and Richard Sorabji, 'Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue', in Amelie O. Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics* [*Essays*] (Berkeley, 1980), 201–19 at 207.

[47] Irwin, 'Disunity', 71. The philosophical claim is identified and challenged by Badhwar, 'Limited Unity', 313–15.

totle's belief in the organic unity of the good. But one way of understanding this belief and its connection to RV is to turn to the orthodox inclusivist account of Aristotle's conception of εὐδαιμονία. The basic claims of inclusivism are: (I1) happiness is a compound of various goods or ends; (I2) happiness 'includes' its subsidiary goods as its components or parts; (I3) happiness is comprehensive: it includes 'all the things generally regarded as desirable'; and (I4) happiness brings rational order to these desirable goods by resolving possible conflicts between them.[48]

Inclusivism appears to explain a number of central Aristotelian claims, and so has significant appeal. In particular, it suggests that Aristotle has good philosophical reasons for accepting an inseparability thesis, and for claiming that the global point of view of practical wisdom is necessary for virtue. The argument is as follows. First, having a virtue requires making a correct judgement about when to pursue the good governed by that virtue. Second, making a correct judgement about when to pursue a given good requires making judgements about how far other goods should be pursued (I4). But, third, this requires comprehensive knowledge of those goods, and so the other virtues.[49] Hence, having even one virtue requires having them all. In particular, it requires having the global point of view of practical wisdom, because each virtue must determine how far its good is to be pursued *relative to all the other goods*.

[48] Contemporary inclusivism has its roots in W. F. R. Hardie, 'The Final Good in Aristotle's Ethics', in J. M. E. Moravcsik (ed.), *Aristotle* (Garden City, NY, 1967), 287–322 at 300–1. Among those already mentioned, interpreters who seem to accept inclusivism include Ackrill, Annas, Cooper, and Irwin. Other examples include Francis Sparshott, *Taking Life Seriously* (Toronto, 1994), 36–8; J. O. Urmson, *Aristotle's Ethics* (Oxford, 1988), 11–13; and White, *Sovereign Virtue*, 11–13. For some of the claims listed in the text see Ackrill, *Aristotle*, 135–6; T. H. Irwin, *Classical Thought* (Oxford, 1989), 134; Irwin (trans.), *Nicomachean Ethics*, 407–8; and Annas, *Morality*, 40–1. Nicholas White also characterizes inclusivism in these ways: see 'Conflicting Parts of Happiness in Aristotle's Ethics', *Ethics*, 105 (1995), 258–83 at 260–1.

[49] This line of reasoning can be illustrated by an example. Suppose I know that pleasure is a good, and so aspire to the virtue of temperance. But I also know that honour is a good. Then, I shall need to know on which occasions I should pursue pleasure and on which occasions I should pursue honour. But knowing when to pursue honour involves having the virtue governing honour. So, I shall need both virtues if I am to have either of the two. For an argument along these lines, though not in defence of inclusivism, see John McDowell, 'Virtue and Reason', *The Monist*, 62 (1979), 331–50.

9. Irwin's solution

If the orthodox interpreters are correct, and especially if Aristotle accepts inclusivism, Aristotle's claims about RV and the large-scale virtues rest on deep structural features of his general account of the virtues and of practical wisdom. Hence, on these assumptions, Irwin is right to claim that the apparent inconsistency between RV and Aristotle's remarks about the large-scale virtues is real and serious, and that Aristotelians would have to give up something significant in order to remove it.

Irwin proposes withdrawing the claim that the large-scale virtues are separable from the other virtues, while retaining the commitment to RV, and so endorsing reciprocity for all the virtues, including magnificence and magnanimity. On the orthodox account, this option is preferable to giving up either RV or the status of magnificence and magnanimity as genuine virtues, because these claims are deeply embedded in Aristotle's theory. It also makes most sense if one accepts inclusivism. According to inclusivism, it is essential to each virtue that there be a judgement made of how far the good governed by that virtue should be pursued relative to other goods. But such a judgement cannot be made in the absence of information about how far other goods should be pursued, and this requires the virtues associated with those goods. Hence, if magnificence and magnanimity are genuine virtues, governing genuine goods, inclusivism seems to demand that they and the other virtues are reciprocally entailing.

Nevertheless, Irwin makes it clear that even his revision comes at a significant price. In particular, the rationale for extending RV to the large-scale virtues depends on a certain understanding of the demand for practical success. But, understood this way, the demand is ultimately unreasonable. Irwin says:

> [The magnificent person] has a range of experience and knowledge that allows him to get the right answer more often than a merely generous person, but the same argument would make it reasonable for a completely virtuous person *to be a doctor or a plumber or to acquire all sorts of other empirical information that might come in handy on some occasion.* Aristotle

seems to have no escape from an encyclopaedic conception of virtue and wisdom.[50]

Hence, according to Irwin, if Aristotle were really to demand practical success from the virtuous person, the virtuous person would need an unreasonably wide range of empirical knowledge and practical training.

Irwin's argument consists of three claims: (1) the rationale for RV extends to the large-scale virtues; (2) extending reciprocity to the large-scale virtues introduces a problem of demandingness; and (3) this problem of demandingness implies a problem of encyclopaedic knowledge. I shall now take issue with each stage of this argument.

10. Inseparability, unity, and demandingness

Consider first claim (1). Suppose we assume that the rationale for RV is inclusivism. According to inclusivism, RV extends to the large-scale virtues because (*a*) having any virtue requires making correct judgements about when to pursue the good governed by that virtue relative to the goods governed by all the other virtues, and (*b*) such judgements require all the other virtues. However, either (*a*) or (*b*) seems to be false in the case of the large-scale virtues. The large-scale virtues govern goods that are inaccessible to most people. Hence either, *contra* (*a*), most people do not need to make judgements about how far the goods governed by magnificence and magnanimity are to be pursued, or, *contra* (*b*), the judgements they make do not require the virtues governing those goods, only the knowledge that these goods are not present to them, which is significantly less knowledge than is required to possess the virtue.

These points indicate a general deficiency in the inclusivist rationale for inseparability. That rationale depends on the idea that an agent must identify and integrate all choiceworthy goods. But it seems possible for an agent to identify all the goods relevant to a situation without having made the comparative judgements about all other goods necessary, according to inclusivism, to possess the virtues. Hence, it is unclear why such an agent cannot act for the

[50] Irwin, 'Disunity', 75 (italics added).

right reason, and perhaps even virtuously. Consider the following example. Suppose an agent, Katherine, knows all the comparative judgements for a particular good, so that she knows what to do in every situation where it might actually come up against another good. Suppose also that she knows that there are some goods with which it will never come into contact. Why cannot she have the virtue governing this good without having the ones governing the goods with which it does not come into contact? Inclusivism seems to have no answer.

My account, by contrast, resolves these problems. First, it explicitly allows for cases like Katherine's. RBV limits the claim of inseparability to apply only to some goods, while the analysis of the large-scale virtues provides a principled reason for doing so: some goods are essentially relative. Second, it preserves the unity of practical wisdom. On the one hand, since the conception of the good on which the basic virtues rely is resilient to error, the non-basic virtues merely add to that conception of the good, and do not change it in essentials. Hence, there is an important sense in which practical wisdom remains unchanged. On the other hand, there remains a role for practical wisdom in the non-basic virtues. For the original conception seems to play a *strong regulative role* in the development of new virtues; and this suggests that the expanded conception of the good on which they rely is to some extent *implicit* in the basic virtues.

Consider now claim (2). Irwin believes that extending reciprocity to the large-scale virtues introduces a problem of demandingness. This seems correct, but it is not clear that he has correctly characterized the problem. The virtues seem vulnerable to at least two different problems of demandingness, and the extension of reciprocity to the large-scale virtues introduces only the first.

The first problem involves unfamiliar situations which arise outside the domain constituting standard conditions.[51] (Call this 'the External Problem'.) An agent has two reasons to worry about unusual situations. First, she may simply go wrong in the new setting; second, her new decisions may cast doubt on her normal behaviour.[52] Nevertheless, it seems unreasonable to require

[51] Badhwar, 'Limited Unity', 315, and Nancy Sherman, *The Fabric of Character* (Oxford, 1989), 52, seem to have this problem in mind.

[52] The second kind of problem is sometimes called the problem of fantastic cases. Of course, some argue that such judgements are irrelevant to those made under stan-

that, in order to be virtuous or happy, an agent have such a *wide* knowledge that she knows what should be done in *all possible situations*.[53]

Now, inclusivism seems to invite the External Problem, since it proposes that all goods, and so all virtues, are extremely interconnected. Recall the claim that the Aristotelian good is comprehensive (I3). In the context of inclusivism, this suggests that an individual agent must identify and integrate all choiceworthy goods before she can have a correct understanding of the final inclusive good, and that she must have this understanding before she can have any virtues. But this seems too demanding.

According to my reading, by contrast, Aristotle's account of the large-scale virtues (and so his assertion of RBV) constitutes a principled response to the External Problem. First, the idea behind their distinction as non-basic is (*a*) that they concern domains where most people living in a good society will not be able to go, and so (*b*) that they are not needed by those people. Hence, Aristotle appears to be shielding most people from some aspects of the External Problem. Second, since the non-basic virtues are genuine virtues, distinguishing them effectively acknowledges the importance of non-standard domains while still insulating the agent from the demand that she have knowledge of those domains. Third, the distinction is compatible with Aristotle's apparent rationale for some degree of inseparability, namely that the virtuous person must be sensitive to all factors relevant to a situation. For it provides a principled way of isolating some domains as irrelevant. Finally, RBV is compatible with the idea that different virtuous people must have the same general conception of the good. If the large-scale virtues simply add to the

dard conditions. But note that there is some burden on those taking this position to offer an explanation of this alleged fact. R. M. Hare, for example, believes that the intuitions we use to make decisions under standard conditions are reliable only within a confined set of conditions, since they were generated in response to those conditions: see Hare, *Moral Thinking* (Oxford, 1981), 49.

[53] Especially worrying is the claim that the agent must identify all independent goods. It is far from clear even how an agent would know when she has done this. Will new situations not always bring with them the chance of discovering a new, hitherto unsuspected, independent good? (The Editor has suggested to me that Aristotle may not take this objection seriously, comparing his claim to prove that there are only five senses (*De anima* 3. 1). But note that Aristotle recognizes the need to argue for that claim, so that we would expect a similar argument in the case of goods, which we do not get.)

conception of the good provided by the basic virtues, then the virtuous rich may have the same general views as other virtuous people.

The second problem of demandingness arises even under normal conditions. In the third step of his argument Irwin suggests that the problem with the large-scale virtues implies that the virtuous person also needs detailed knowledge of matters such as medicine and engineering, since having such expert skills may allow an agent to perform a more successful action. This suggests that the virtuous person must have extensive empirical knowledge and a wide range of specialist skills. But surely it is unreasonable to demand that, in order to be virtuous or happy, an agent needs the *deep, detailed* knowledge necessary to resolve any particular problem that may arise *in the best possible way*. (Call this 'the Internal Problem'.)

Both inclusivism and my account are vulnerable to the Internal Problem. However, this problem is not specific to the large-scale virtues, but confronts any description of the virtues that demands success.[54] Presumably, it is almost always possible to perform a more successful action with more knowledge, and in particular with the kind of expert knowledge that a physician or engineer has. Therefore, to the extent that virtue requires success, it will thereby be possible to act more virtuously as a result of more knowledge. On this understanding of virtue, a person could act more courageously in battle if he knew more about the enemy's weaknesses; more generously in making charitable donations if he knew more about the needs of the poor; and so on. But then the Internal Problem applies just as much to *individual virtues* as to the virtues considered collectively, and just as much to individual basic virtues as to the non-basic virtues. So, the non-basic virtues raise no distinct problem. Indeed, the Internal Problem primarily concerns the *depth* of knowledge required for any individual virtue or group of virtues. Hence, it *could not* be resolved merely by making relational claims, such as those involved in asserting various kinds of interconnectedness, such as RV, or RBV.[55]

[54] Irwin uses examples in a later paper which show an awareness of this. See his 'Virtue, Praise and Success: Stoic Responses to Aristotle', *The Monist*, 73/1 (1990), 59–96 at 63–5.

[55] To think otherwise would be to assume that whatever knowledge is required for successful action on one virtue is always present in other virtues. But this would

Hence, the Internal Problem is essentially irrelevant to the debate about RV.[56]

My account of the non-basic virtues nevertheless suggests a general way in which Aristotle may confront the problem of demandingness. The essentially relative nature of the goods governed by magnanimity and magnificence implies that there are genuine and defensible limits to the demands of virtue on at least some people. The lack of relatively high wealth or natural advantages constitutes a real boundary which, under normal circumstances, restricts the number of decisions that most agents aiming to be virtuous need to make, the sensitivities they need to acquire, and the goods they need to consider. Thus, if similar boundaries can be found elsewhere, additional limits might be placed on the demands of virtue and it may be possible to overcome the Internal Problem.[57] This is not the place to assess the details or prospects of such an approach, or of the reasonableness of attributing it to Aristotle. But the distinction between the basic and non-basic virtues suggests that it is worthy of further investigation.

involve attributing deeper knowledge to the other virtues, a move which simply shifts the Internal Problem from one virtue to another.

[56] It might also be said that the External Problem does not imply the Internal Problem, as Irwin's remarks suggest. On the usual understanding of the rationale for RV, it is plausible to think that the External Problem arises because without comprehensive knowledge of goods the virtuous person will be insensitive to some important moral demands, and so will make *evaluative* mistakes in assessing situations. By contrast, the problem of encyclopaedic knowledge as Irwin sees it involves non-evaluative empirical information. But Aristotle need not be committed to demanding extensive knowledge of this kind of the virtuous person, and such a demand is not implied by a concern with the External Problem. After all, Aristotle may, like Kant, be more concerned that the virtuous person not make moral mistakes than that she not make empirical mistakes.

Unfortunately, this reply is not decisive. The Internal Problem may not be confined to non-moral knowledge. Given the demand for success, the virtuous person might also require extensive moral knowledge. For example, in order to challenge deontological views, Samuel Scheffler considers situations where an agent could prevent the torture of many people by torturing one person herself: see his 'Agent-centered Restrictions, Rationality and the Virtues', in Scheffler (ed.), *Consequentialism and its Critics* (Oxford, 1988), 243–60. Arguably, the problems created by such situations are not generated by either unfamiliar contexts or unusual kinds of actions. Instead, they involve familiar considerations arranged in unfamiliar, but all too possible, ways *within standard conditions*. However, this is a different problem from the one Irwin envisages, and requires separate discussion.

[57] In particular, perhaps other goods or natural features of the world either have, or can be made to have, characteristics of this kind. If this is so, perhaps it is possible to provide secure normative standard conditions for people operating in society by using facts about people and institutions to limit the kinds of situations that occur. In other words, perhaps it is possible to create the conditions for virtue by discerning or designing an appropriate social setting for it. Arguably, this is the project in which Aristotle takes himself to be involved. That would explain why he regards the relationship between metaphysics, politics, and human nature as central to his ethics. For perhaps he believes that some metaphysical, political, and natural facts either (*a*) constitute real natural boundaries to the ethical judgements that need to be made, or (*b*) might be made to do so through factors such as appropriate institutional design.

11. Conclusion

Conventional wisdom holds that for Aristotle all the virtues are reciprocally entailing. But Irwin has shown that this claim conflicts with Aristotle's explicit remarks about magnificence and magnanimity. Irwin's view is that this conflict exposes a deep contradiction at the heart of Aristotle's theory that is best resolved by withdrawing the claim that the large-scale virtues are separable. However, he argues that this threatens to leave Aristotle making unreasonable demands of the virtuous person. This paper argues for an alternative solution. Textually, Aristotle's claim about inseparability may apply only to a set of basic virtues. Philosophically, Aristotle may have good reason to distinguish magnificence and magnanimity from the basic virtues, and so not to require them of most people, for each concerns goods that are accessible only to some. This solution not only frees Aristotle from contradiction, but suggests one way in which he may be aware of the problem of demandingness, and may try to shield the virtuous person from it.

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